In 1961, J. C. Holt's groundbreaking study, The Northerners , based on a detailed analysis drawn from one very important region, offered an interpretation of the origins and course of the 1215 revolt against King John and of the civil war that followed.
1 His conclusions, which in most respects have remained unchallenged, were that the revolt in the north derived from a level of royal financial pressure unprecedented in that region, an over-ruthless political exploitation of the consequent debts, and resentment at King John's aggressive use of patronage to favour a narrow circle of the 'king's friends'. This latter category included some local men, but also those who were from outside the region and, in some cases, from outside England. Grievances over these men and their behaviour are not easily separable from the financial pressure. If 'the harshness and corruption of some administrators' was a grievance, this was partly because of 'the harshness of the policies which they had in any case Addressing the question of loyalists rather than rebels, Painter suggested that the barons of the Welsh marches were largely loyal because the Welsh were in revolt.
14 This is a rather unconvincing argument given that the rebel Welsh were capable at least of offering security to the Welsh lands of marcher rebels. The argument is also premised on the solidity or near-solidity of marcher loyalty, a questionable assertion that, as we have seen above, is not unique to Painter. In explaining the loyal faction that undoubtedly did exist in the Welsh marches, Warren's suggestions on the role of Irish affairs seem to represent a more promising approach than Painter's. 15 Another route taken by Painter in attempting to explain the local patterns of rebellion and loyalty was that of investigating the interconnections between rebel barons. However, he focused here more on the eastern and northern rebels, and even with these the analysis proved ultimately inconclusive. 16 Painter generally held to his view that the local patterns of loyalty or rebellion could not be explained on a geographical basis. Instead, 'the dominant factor was the attitude of the great barons'. 17 In linking the individual decisions of these great barons with rebellion or loyalty further down the social scale, Painter did not press the argument for an explicitly feudal relationship. Although he was confident that the rebellion was 'largely baronial', he mentioned only the possibility that many of the lesser rebels were acting as vassals of rebel lords; he was sceptical of historians' ability to demonstrate this. 18 Holt, in his chapter 'The northern knights' in The Northerners , laid out at considerable length the difficulties in ascertaining and analysing the behaviour of knights, but his conclusions were more forceful than Painter's: 'Many knights simply followed their lord, either against or for the King'; 'the rebellion revealed broadly feudal characteristics'; and 'the general impression of the evidence is that the great rebel lords were followed by the men whom they might reasonably regard as their particular tenants almost to a man'. Even the revolt of tenants of the honour of Richmond, rebelling against their lord, 'bore a feudal and tenurial stamp'.
19
Contrary views have been presented. Hugh M. Thomas, in his study of the Yorkshire gentry, accepted that honorial ties had 'a moderate Rebellion in south-western England and the Welsh marches, 1215-17 189 influence on loyalties in the rebellion' and that 'lords had influence on at least some vassals', but argued against the strength of the evidence for honorial solidarity, also criticizing, with some force, one of Holt's main examples, the behaviour of the Mowbray tenants.
20 Thomas therefore placed more stress on the Yorkshire gentry's own 'grievances and burdens' in explaining their participation in the revolt.
21 Kathryn Faulkner, in her study of the knights of Bedfordshire, Cambridgeshire, Huntingdonshire and Northamptonshire in 1215-17, addressed the question of whether knights predominantly followed their lords in the conflict. Her conclusion on this point was that, while ties of lordship could still be a factor, 'many knights were able to choose their own course in 1215-17, and that in doing so they showed a bias towards rebellion'.
22
The problem with this debate is the nature of the evidence. Many of its difficulties have already been outlined by Painter, Holt, Thomas and Faulkner. All sides accept that tenurial bonds could play a part in determining whether a knight rebelled or remained loyal to the king. Yet, as Holt himself noted: 'Examples of tenurial solidarity are easy to find. So also are examples of the opposite.'
23 The question as to how far tenurial bonds were in general important can only be answered either statistically or impressionistically. The evidence of reversi lists, with their acknowledged gaps, can bear very little statistical weight, while impressionistic conclusions are both drawn from, and better applied to, a wider debate about the strength or weakness of feudal structures in the late twelfth and early thirteenth centuries.
24
There is no attempt here to address systematically for south-western England and the Welsh marches the question of whether men followed their lords in rebellion or loyalty. This is partly for a practical reason: because of the size of the area, the number of knightly tenants is too great for all to be investigated. Even were it to be practicable, however, it is doubtful whether such an attempt could do more than multiply the 21 Thomas, p. 189. 22 Faulkner, 'Knights in the Magna Carta civil war', pp. 1-8. Holt had already admitted that 'to travel south from the Border was to journey from the simple to the complex' (Holt, Northerners, p. 41). Although he was really talking here about differences within 'the north', it certainly implied a question mark over the midlands and the south. 23 Holt, Northerners, p. 51. 24 This wider debate is summarized and added to in Carpenter, 'Second century of English feudalism', pp. 30-71. examples we already have, showing that some men followed their lords and that some did not. In general, the concentration in this article is on baronial tenants-in-chief. They were men of greatly varying importance, but it is unlikely that many of any significance have slipped entirely through the net of evidence, at least after the renewal of the struggle in October 1215 when the sources become fuller. This gives us a fairly comprehensive view of this group. This article will try to provide a fairer assessment of the strength of the revolt, to give some of the reasons for that strength and to make some suggestions as to how the western revolt related, and in some ways contributed, to the final outcome of the crisis. It will discuss first south-western England and then the Welsh marches.
To cross south-western England westwards from the important royal castles of Corfe, Salisbury, Marlborough and Devizes was to travel from important centres of royal power to a rather remote periphery.
25
Although, since the death of Reginald earl of Cornwall in 1175, Cornwall had been part of the normal shire structure, for long periods before that it had been a virtually autonomous lordship. As we shall see, during the rebellion there were dangers that the county would again become such a lordship. Neither Cornwall nor Devon was visited by King John or the regent William Marshal during the conflict of 1215-17. John only once briskly crossed eastern Somerset on his way from Gloucestershire to Dorset in 1216; the regent did not visit Somerset at all.
26 Somerset was also notable for an absence of royal castles, although Bristol, held by the king, was close to northern Somerset and the prominent loyalists Peter des Roches, bishop of Winchester, and William Briwerre did have castles at Taunton and Bridgewater respectively.
27
The five south-western counties contained their full share of the administrative and political classes of England. In Kathryn Faulkner's attempt to estimate the number of administrative knights in the different counties of England in the period 1199-1216, 527 were located in the south-western counties and some 348 of these in Cornwall, Devon and Somerset. These figures compare with the 1,186 located within J. C. Holt Rebellion in south-western England and the Welsh marches, 1215-17 191 broadest interpretation of the extent of the north, which included more than twice as many counties as the south-west.
28
Of the two earls whose titles derived from counties of the southwestern region, one, William earl of Salisbury, was one of the more poorly endowed earls, even after he obtained most of the honour of Trowbridge around 1214.
29 The other, William de Redvers, earl of Devon, held the largest barony based in the region, although even his was hardly a lordship of the first rank.
30 Moreover, by 1215 he was an old man and not, it seems, very active. 31 In terms of knight's fees in the south-western counties, both of these lordships were outshone by the more southerly dependencies of the huge honour of Gloucester.
32 Only three other baronies in the region amounted individually to more than fifty knight's fees: those of Robert de Courtenay in Devon, and of Robert of Cardinham and Reginald de Vautorte in Cornwall.
33
Table 1 (see below, p. 35) presents an analysis of baronial rebellion in southwestern England.
34 For purposes of comparison, Table 2 (p. 37) provides a list of barons who are either known to have been loyal or for whom there is no evidence of rebellion. Together, they show that a substantial part of the baronage of the south-western counties of England, at least at one time or another, can be shown to have been in rebellion. If, with the exception of the honour of Gloucester, not shown in these tables, and of the earl of Salisbury in his relatively short period of rebellion, the 28 K. Faulkner, 'The transformation of knighthood in early 13th-century England', Eng. Hist. Rev., cxi (1996), 1-23, at p. 6. Although Holt forswears a definite geographical extent for 'the north', for this purpose of comparison it has been taken to include all the counties that he concerned himself with, i.e., Northumberland, Durham, Cumberland, Westmorland, Lancashire, Yorkshire, Cheshire, Staffordshire, Nottinghamshire, Derbyshire and Lincolnshire (Holt, Northerners, 32 Around 145 knight's fees of the honour of Gloucester were located in south-west England by the 1211-12 inquest, while the same source gives only 58 knight's fees in the Welsh marches (not counting Glamorgan), all in Gloucestershire. There were, of course, also many knight's fees outside both of the regions dealt with here (Red Book of the Exchequer, ed. H. Hall (1 vol. in 3, Rolls ser., 1896), ii. 607-10 (hereafter Red Book of the Exchequer)). 33 Note that the barony Totnes was divided and Reginald de Vautorte, who came of age in 1215 and had been a ward of Peter des Roches, bishop of Winchester, acquired half of it, considerably augmenting the lordship he had based on the barony of Trematon (Vincent, 116) . 34 In Tables 1-4 (below, pp. 35-40), and elsewhere in the article, the author has used the baronies and probable baronies of Sanders, English Baronies as a rough and ready guide to baronial status, although he has listed separately those marcher lordships in Wales that are often combined in Sanders's classification, as well as some lordships in Wales not included at all by Sanders. greater barons tended not to be among the rebels, this does not seem to have been an effective discouragement to the rebellion of lesser barons. The rebellion was not confined to specific areas. Out of the five counties concerned, only in one -Cornwall -were there no baronial rebels, and even in this case the absence is misleading.
King John's sheriff in Cornwall at the start of 1215 was John Fitz Richard, in control of Launceston castle and the royal demesne in Cornwall, made up of the remaining demesne of the old, forfeited honour of Mortain. John Fitz Richard held around seven knight's fees of the honour himself and, but for the persistence of the notion of that honour, might be considered of baronial or semi-baronial status in his own right.
35 Despite King John's order, he resisted replacement as sheriff from 30 May 1215 until after Magna Carta. After that he was replaced, probably by 17 September 1215. However, subsequently he was at least intermittently a rebel up until June 1217. In November 1216, though, he was apparently in the king's service and was ordered to hand over the castle of Lydford in Devon to William Briwerre. Whether he obeyed this order is unclear.
36
At first sight, there seems no very obvious reason for John Fitz Richard's recalcitrance and rebellion, except for his loss of office. Some of his lands in Dorset and Somerset seem to have fallen into the hands of the king because of the rebellion of William de Montacute, who had held the lands as John Fitz Richard's custodian.
37 Although it is not clear when this happened, it is suggestive of some of John Fitz Richard's connections and, as will be discussed below, others may have shared the objection to his dismissal as sheriff.
Another focus for trouble in Cornwall seems to have been the twenty knight's fees in that county of the honour of Ongar, the collection of lands that had been built up by Henry Two factors may help to explain this conundrum. As a backdrop to the local politics of Devon, it is important at least to be conscious of the Braose claims to Totnes and Barnstaple. Giles de Braose was awarded seisin of these, along with the rest of his father's lands, as part of his agreement with King John in October 1215, although it is not clear how far these provisions had been carried out before Giles's death in November 1215.
47 Certainly, after the war, Reginald de Braose prosecuted these claims and it is difficult to know whether or not the Braose family had supporters in Devon during the war.
48 Devon is also a large county and many baronial honours, including those held by rebels based elsewhere, had lands and dependencies there. The tenants of the honour of Gloucester, for example, had considerable lands in Devon.
49
In addition to the relatively numerous rebel barons of Somerset, one other man should certainly be mentioned. Rebellion in south-western England and the Welsh marches, 1215-17 195 to Henry III, having obtained pledges for his faithful service, but he seems to have been dead by 29 June 1217.
53
The honour of Gloucester provides a link between the two regions of this study. Although important in Gloucestershire and Wales, it also had a significant part to play in south-western England, particularly in Somerset, Devon and Dorset. When Painter wrote, he was doubtful as to the extent to which Geoffrey de Mandeville, earl of Essex, had possession of the honour of Gloucester, his wife Isabelle's lands. However, it now seems clear that, at the outbreak of the rebellion, the honour, including the attached honour of Glamorgan, was largely in Geoffrey's hands. 54 There is no sign that Geoffrey de Mandeville visited the region during the rebellion and war, but that does not make the honour of Gloucester of no consequence.
A considerable number of notable tenants of the honour were rebels at some time. Although we are very ill-informed about lesser rebels in the period before the granting of Magna Carta, one of the few we do know about is Josce de Bayeux, who held four knight's fees of the earl of Gloucester. He certainly had lands in Somerset and perhaps also in Dorset, as well as in Gloucestershire, and he may have been in rebellion until July or September 1217.
55 Other rebels or their families held fiefs of the honour of Gloucester in various south-western counties. These included Nicholas, William, Brian and Peter de la Mara (or de Mara); Henry de Glanville; Nicholas Pointz; Roger of Raymes; Roger de Vilers; and William and Hugh de Neville, the latter the king's chief forester and castellan of Marlborough. William Fitz John, the rebel baron of Great Torrington in Devon, was also a significant tenant of the honour of Gloucester.
56 It is doubtful if Hugh de Neville's Gloucester connections were foremost in his abandonment of King John in the summer of 1216 as Prince Louis progressed across the southern counties, but this defection from the curial heart of John's regime had an importance in its own right, not least in the handing over of Marlborough castle. The rebellion in south-western England was therefore both substantial and sustained. However, Painter's contention, that in determining the shape and extent of the rebellion as a whole 'the dominant factor was the attitude of the great barons', seems hardly appropriate here.
58 That the lord of the honour of Gloucester was a rebel is clearly of some significance, although Geoffrey de Mandeville seems throughout to have been in the east of the country or in London, and his death in March 1216 seems not to have weakened the rebellion in south-west England or in the Welsh marches. One might also think that his brief tenure of the honour was not likely to have generated much honorial loyalty to him personally. On the other hand, he held the lands by right of his wife, Isabelle, who was not accounted a reversa until September 1217, and she may have inspired more loyalty among the tenants of the honour.
Henry de Bohun, earl of Hereford, might be allowed some role in the rebellion in Wiltshire, although as in the case of Geoffrey de Mandeville, there is no evidence of his personal presence in south-western England or in the Welsh marches, even though these were the principal regions in which he held or claimed lands. Henry's rebellion is perhaps one of the more easily explicable, much disturbed as he presumably was by the loss of his Wiltshire honour of Trowbridge after 1212, the honour being acquired by William earl of Salisbury around 1214.
59 If royal instructions were followed, Henry ought to have regained the honour by 21 June 1215 and the castle by 28 June 1215, although to what extent these orders were effective and for how long, given the resumption of the war in the autumn of 1215, is not clear.
60
William earl of Salisbury was a major addition to the rebel ranks in the south-west, even if only for the nine months or so between the summer of 1216 and early March 1217. The earl may have had a very personal grievance in the supposed seduction of his wife by John. Judging by his later demanding stance with regard to the regency government, William may also have felt simply that he had been insufficiently rewarded for his stalwart services to his half-brother, the king. Others may have joined or later left the rebellion on the earl's account, although tenurial loyalties 58 Painter, Reign of King John, p. 290. 59 Henry de Bohun is not often easy to locate with certainty during the rebellion and civil war. While he did not have any significant lands outside the west, he was still captured at the battle of Lincoln (Chronica Majora, iii. Below the level of rebel earls, there was plenty of room for the dissatisfaction of individuals. Throughout the country, John exerted a growing financial pressure from 1203 onwards, pressure that became greater still by 1207 and most intense in the years 1210 -12. Both royal cash revenues and debts to the crown were rising significantly.
62 It is, however, problematic to identify payments and debts to the king as causes of particular resentment. They were, in a sense, just part of the political game -albeit a game that was becoming rougher and more dangerous in the course of John's reign. For example, the rebel Robert de Mandeville in Dorset had been made to fine quite heavily -800 marks and eight palfreys -for the barony of Marshwood. He no doubt regarded the honour as his rightful inheritance, but the descent was complicated and disputed. It was a case where the king might be expected to demand more than usual for a favourable decision, and whether Robert felt aggrieved about the amount he was called upon to pay is not clear.
63
Other rebels, too, such as William Malet and William de Montague, could have been resentful of their financial treatment by John, but as this article will show, there may have been more to their revolt than this.
Beyond individual dissatisfaction and grievance, there were signs of a more systemic problem affecting relations between the local community and the king in the south-west. In 1203-4 the men of Devon fined for 5,000 marks to disafforest parts of the county, 1,000 marks to be paid per annum over five years.
64 This does not, however, seem to have solved their problems with the royal forest. In 1208-9 the men of Devon are found owing 300 marks and a palfrey, apparently for a fine to prevent Hugh de Neville from carrying out a regard and perambulation in the royal forest.
65
In 1203-4 the men of Cornwall arranged an elaborate fine for 2,200 marks that the county might be disafforested and that they might have a 64 The bishop of Exeter, the earl of Devon and perhaps others were not, at least initially, included in this fine, but were allowed the possibility of arranging their inclusion with the men of Devon who had negotiated the fine (Pipe Roll 6 John, p. 85).
65 Pipe Roll 11 John, p. 92.
sheriff from among their own people, whose power would at the same time be restricted. Even if this sheriff were to prove unsatisfactory to the king, another was then to be appointed who did not hate them and who would treat them well. The sheriff before this fine was made had been William Briwerre, of whom more will be said below. 66 In spite of this fine, the men of Cornwall had to fine again in 1207-8 to remit the king's ill will and to have a sheriff from among their number residing in the county, perhaps a response to having Geoffrey de Neville, the king's chamberlain, placed over them. It was subsequent to this that John Fitz Richard, who would have been accounted a local man, was appointed sheriff (William de Boterell, another local man, took up the office after the first fine).
67 In April 1215 it was still apparently necessary to try to conciliate the men of Cornwall by issuing a charter granting privileges relating to the forest, the stanneries, the sheriffdom, the taxation of the fees of the honour of Mortain and runaway villeins.
68
We know little about the instigators of these arrangements in Devon and Cornwall, but in the counties of Dorset and Somerset the sources are more revealing. In 1209-10 the men of Dorset and Somerset fined for 1,200 marks to be quit of the 100 mark increment on the farm of the counties and to have a sheriff from their own ranks, resident in the shires, explicitly excluding William Briwerre and his associates. 69 William Briwerre had been sheriff from December 1207 to Christmas 1209. He was then replaced with William Malet who was subsequently revealed as the leader of those negotiating the fine.
70
In 1212, it became apparent that there were serious problems over this fine. The king wrote to a named group of fourteen Dorset and Somerset landholders ordering them to come to the exchequer to answer for themselves and the other knights of Dorset and Somerset, because they had not kept to the fine they had made through William Malet for having a local man as sheriff. 71 By Michaelmas 1212, 350 marks of the original fine remained unpaid, but there was evidently a dispute. William Malet had, it seemed, promised 200 marks more than the men of the counties had agreed to, as well as promising, without authorization, £100 to 82 In one sense, this was a late example of John's attempts to satisfy outstanding claims after the Runnymede settlement, although most examples involved the rebels of 1215 rather than loyalists. 83 There must have been the hope that this potentially major concession would secure the loyalty of Cornwall. However, by 16 November 1215, Henry Fitz Count's behaviour must have confirmed any royal doubts that there had been about this move. The sheriffdom was taken from him and committed again to Robert of Cardinham. In the letter to the county, the king made it known that 'it was not through us that Henry Fitz Count took fidelities and homages of our demesnes'. 84 Henry's father, Reginald earl of Cornwall, had not accounted at the exchequer for Cornwall and had, as far as we can tell, had lordship over all the landholders of the county. Henry had apparently been going against royal wishes in trying to recreate his father's position in the county, or, at the very least, in jumping the gun. Yet if King John would not stand for this, on 7 February 1217 the regency government felt the need to give way, granting Henry the county of Cornwall just as his father had held it, and assuring him that he would not be disseised of it 'except by the consideration and judgement of our court'. Letters followed the next day, attempting to protect certain lands of William Briwerre senior and junior. 85 In November 1217, letters had to be sent to try to protect Robert of Cardinham from Henry.
86
It is worth asking how serious for John and his heir the revolt in southwestern England was. Certainly, the king had a very secure base in Dorset at Corfe, which no more came under threat throughout the whole struggle than did Nottingham. As we have seen, Exeter was in danger in the early days of the revolt, but in general it is clear that in south-western England, as elsewhere, the rebels alone did not have the offensive force to sweep King John or the regency away by force. The rebels indeed were, in general, under the greater pressure. They could be harried, distrained, even sometimes captured; 87 loyalists could be offered their land. There was some strengthening of the revolt in the summer of 1216, while it seems to have progressively, if gradually, weakened after the return to Henry III's allegiance of William earl of Salisbury in March 1217. If, at least before that, there was what might be described as a stalemate, although in the king's favour, this situation was fragile.
Prince Louis and his French troops had the potential to change the balance dramatically. Loyalty for barons in the south-west was a reasonably safe option unless Louis threatened their lands. However, if the rebels -west, east, south or north -could not face King John's main household forces, neither John nor the regent ventured to oppose Prince Louis and his troops; not until, that is, the regent had the chance to catch only a portion of them at Lincoln. After Louis had taken Winchester, Farnham and Odiham in Hampshire, John's position seemed far from secure. When Louis advanced, there was a clear danger that loyal barons would despair of Plantagenet prospects and switch sides. The safety of major royal castles depended on the loyalty of the men who held them. Victory for the regency government in 1217 came at a price for royal authority in the south-west. The re-issues of a modified Magna Carta in November 1216 and November 1217, along with the Charter of the Forest at the latter date, with their restrictions on the operation of royal lordship and the activities of royal officials, answered some, although not all, of the problems of south-western landholders. They would presumably have preferred that the 1215 Magna Carta's ban on increments to the county farms had survived into the new charters.
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More specifically, Cornwall was no longer accounting at the exchequer. Henry Fitz Count was trying to impose his lordship on the whole county and even tried to exclude royal justices.
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The return of William earl of Salisbury to Henry III's allegiance was accompanied by his re-establishment as sheriff of Wiltshire and castellan of Salisbury, perhaps by hereditary right.
93 Moreover, William was granted the castle of Sherborne and, most notably, the counties of Somerset and Devon, for his homage and service, 'salvo regali nostro', with instructions to the men of the counties to swear fidelity and perform homage to him, 'salva fide domini regis'. They were to answer to him 'tanquam domino suo'. The regency government clearly feared that if these grants were not put into effect, William would again join Prince Louis.
94
In the event, William did account for Wiltshire in the exchequer year 1217-18, although he paid no cash into the treasury from the farm. 
97
These troubles turned out better than they might have done for the regency government. However, it would still be true to say that, if the strength of the rebellion in the south-west was, as argued here, caused by individual and collective dissatisfaction at the pressure of John's government and at the curial clique that had operated it at a local level for the government's and their own benefit, it could be said that it at least partially succeeded, and at relatively little cost to the rebels. There was no long toll of released captives in the south-west struggling with ransoms. Also, one might say that loyalists like Henry Fitz Count, Robert of Cardinham, Robert de Courtney and William earl of Salisbury (loyal for most of the time) were not, to say the least, unequivocally on the side of the government in a struggle with local society. They, just as much as the rebels, helped to set limits to the Plantagenet centralization that had come to a head in John's reign.
Let us turn now to the Welsh marches. From soon after the Norman Conquest, the area of the Welsh frontier and beyond had always presented the English crown with a double problem: the Welsh princes and the marcher lordships. These lordships were, in part, a means of keeping the Welsh in check, but their military strength, their special legal status and their semi-autonomous dealings with the Welsh and each other made them a potential threat to the king. 98 The events of the period 1207-11 had allowed King John to exercise unprecedented power in the Welsh marches.
99 Through his servants, John held more castles in the area than any previous king. This remained true at the outbreak of the rebellion in 1215, even though there had been some royal concessions to barons from 1212 onwards.
100 The two most important royal strongholds were Bristol in Gloucestershire, which had effectively been separated from the honour of Gloucester since John's own rebellion against Richard I, and Bridgenorth in Shropshire. Only in the northern march, where the earl of Chester held sway, was the king not directly interested. The importance of the Welsh marches to the crown was reflected during the conflict of 1215-17 by John's visits to the area and by the regent's activities. Even before the conflict broke out, in December 1214, when the coming storm was already on the horizon, John made a tour through Gloucestershire, Herefordshire and Worcestershire, visiting Gloucestershire again briefly in February 1215. In late July and early August 1215, during the lull that followed Magna Carta, John made a quick progress from Gloucestershire up to Bridgenorth in Shropshire and back via Worcester. In 1216, from 19 July to 21 August, he made an extended campaign through the area, from Bristol as far north as Whitchurch in Shropshire. After John's death, the young Henry III was crowned at Gloucester and the regent used Bristol and Gloucester as his principal bases.
101 The Welsh marches were therefore of much greater concern to both King John and the regent than the south-west beyond Wiltshire and Dorset.
At first glance, Faulkner's estimates of the numbers of administrative knights in 1199-1216 for the five English counties of the Welsh marches would, at 385, seem to suggest a proportionally rather small politically and administratively active class.
102 However, one should in this region allow for a rather lesser incidence of the royal procedures that allow us to see these administrative knights, and for the probability of rather more than the usual level of military activity by the knightly class, given the circumstances of the marches. It also has to be emphasized that Faulkner's figures do not include any of the lands in Wales. Regarding the size of the knightly political community, the north, even generously interpreted, cannot be said to overshadow south-western England and the Welsh marches added together.
Of the earls whose titles derived from the region of the Welsh marches, Henry de Bohun, earl of Hereford, at the outbreak of the rebellion was very much the poor relation of the comital class, especially after he had lost the honour of Trowbridge to the earl of Salisbury. Ranulf earl of Chester, on the other hand, possessed one of the greatest honours both in the region and in the kingdom as a whole. Still greater though, was the honour possessed by Geoffrey de Mandeville. Although earl of Essex and not accorded the title earl of Gloucester, his wife was certainly the countess of Gloucester and, as we have seen, from 1214 had possession of at least most of the honour. Of other baronies in the region, only three had lordship over more than fifty knight's fees: William Marshal's honour based at Chepstow; Ralph de Somery's at Dudley in Worcestershire; and Walter de Lacy's at Weobley in Herefordshire. However, it is also important to note that the baronies and marcher lordships that had been taken in 1208 from William de Braose (d. 1211) amounted to some 130 knight's fees and much of this power would be reconstituted by Giles and Reginald de Braose during the 1215-17 conflict.
103 Table 3 (see below, p. 38) lists the rebel barons in the Welsh marches, together with details of their rebellions and returns to loyalty. Table 4 (see below, p. 40) lists barons known to be loyal, or at least not known to have rebelled. If the list of loyal barons is somewhat longer than in the south-west, the number and proportion of rebel barons is still much greater than one would expect from some historians' assessment of the strength of loyalty in the area.
104
Of the English counties included here in the Welsh marches, only in Cheshire were there no baronial rebels. Of course, as Ranulf earl of Chester was loyal and the only baron of the king based in the county, this was necessarily so. It may well also have been true that there was 'not a single example of a rebel holding land of the earl of Chester infra Limam except where, as in the case of the Constable, John de Lacy, he also held baronies or important mesne tenures elsewhere'. The earl had, as Holt pointed out, issued a charter of liberties for Cheshire apparently of his own free will and perhaps this or the earl's power quelled any inclination to rebel.
105
However, it is difficult to see which sources would tell us if there were rebels in Cheshire, if land there constituted their only holdings. The earl's charter of liberties would suggest at least some pressure from below in 1215.
Although rebel barons must take up most of our attention, again we cannot ignore men of lesser status. The tenants of the honour of Gloucester provide one of the clearest links between south-western England and the Welsh marches. Some tenant rebels who had lands in the south-west also had lands in the Welsh marches, and there were other tenant rebels there as well. Of the de la Mara (or de Mara) clan of Gloucester tenants, Peter de Mara held land in Herefordshire, as well as in Wiltshire and the honour of Wallingford.
106 Thomas de la Mara, perhaps the most important of them, held ten knight's fees in Gloucestershire of the honour, although he held land of the loyalist Walter de Lacy as well.
107 The rebel Gloucester tenant Nicholas Pointz held more than seven knight's fees of the honour and had land primarily in Gloucestershire as well as in Dorset and Somerset. Osbert Waspail seems to have been a tenant in both Gloucestershire and the south-west, and William of Cardiff held one knight's fee of the honour in Gloucestershire.
108
Important tenants of the honour of Glamorgan -Raymond de Sully, Herbert de St. Quintin, Robert le Sor, Henry de Umfraville and Gilbert de Turbeville -were also among the rebels. These also generally had lands in Gloucestershire, the south-western counties or both.
109 Outside Glamorgan, where there is no evidence of any royal or loyalist activity, it is difficult to know how effective the resistance of these Gloucester tenant rebels was. In December 1215, Geoffrey de Mandeville's men were still apparently holding the castle of Hanley in Worcestershire against the king when it was granted to the loyalist Roger de Clifford junior, 'if he could take it'.
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In the early part of 1216, or very late 1215 at the earliest, a letter from Walter de Clifford junior to King John reported on the situation in Herefordshire, past and present. He wrote that the whole county of Hereford, apart from the barons and their commilitones, had been with Giles de Braose, the rebel bishop of Hereford, against the king. However, after the bishop had come to the king's peace in October 1215, all had been loyal except three named knights -Walter of Stokes, Robert de Evereus and Richard Tirel -who were with Reginald de Braose. Walter de Clifford junior also wrote of the imminent threat from the Welsh when the current truce was due to end on 18 April 1216 and asked for the return of his own barons who were then with the king, so as to be able to offer resistance.
111
This document has been used to support the argument that tenants followed their lords in rebellion or loyalty, although it does not really sustain such an interpretation.
112 Whatever the precise meaning of commilitones, it says surely both more and less than the 'tenants' of the barons. Likewise, 'the whole county, excepting the barons and their commilitones', can hardly be read as the tenants of Giles de Braose. The letter surely does say something about the solidarities of the Herefordshire community, but these cannot be reduced to honorial solidarities.
In Shropshire, two men of note rebelled, apart from the rebel barons. Bartholomew Turet, lord of the Morton castle that passed to the Corbets in the twelve-thirties, was a rebel reseised of lands in Shropshire, Cornwall, Leicestershire, Oxfordshire and Yorkshire at the end of the civil war. 113 That figure of later legend, the evidently colourful Fulk Fitz Warin, lord of Whittington, was prominent enough to be noticed by Roger of Wendover and Innocent III. 114 In September 1217, he was still Henry III's manifestus inimicus, although he must have come to terms soon afterwards.
115
Painter's argument that, as an explanation of the prevalence of rebellion in any particular area, the individual decisions of the great barons were the biggest factor, would seem to work rather better in terms of the Welsh marches than in the south-west. 116 We might allow Geoffrey de Mandeville and his wife, as lord and lady of the honours of Gloucester and Glamorgan, and Henry de Bohun, earl of Hereford, as lord of the Gwent-Gloucestershire honour of Caldicot, to be among those 'great barons'. 117 However, when we turn to other rebel 'great barons' of the region, some questions emerge about the nature of the leadership of such men.
Giles de Braose, and subsequently Reginald de Braose, might be regarded as of the highest status, but at the beginning of the rebellion, they were not in possession of the Braose lands, with the exception of the land of Giles's bishopric of Hereford. Giles had his own very special status, too, that does not perhaps deserve Painter's dismissal of him as 'a wild marcher lord covered with clerical vestments'. 118 As the only rebel bishop associated with 'the Army of God and the Holy Church', his episcopal office was surely not without importance to the rebels.
The rebel John Fitz Alan was the brother and, at least by 1217, the heir of William Fitz Alan (d. 1215-17), but again, at the outbreak of the rebellion, William Fitz Alan was a minor and the lands, and presumably William himself, were in the custody of Thomas of Erdinton. Osbert Fitz Alan, perhaps another brother or an uncle of the family, also rebelled in 1215. 119 William Marshal junior, whose anticipated inheritance lay chiefly in the region of the Welsh marches, was a rebel from the early stages to March 1217. It would seem that he had considerable support, although unfortunately we cannot specify from where or from whom. He was named immediately after the earls and counts among the twenty-five barons of Magna Carta and credited with a contingent of knights equalled only by Geoffrey de Mandeville. At least in the summer of 1216, he was active in the west when the rebels took control of Worcester. 120 As merely the heir of William Marshal senior, his very high status among the rebels was not based on lands that he controlled or on the number of his tenants by knight-service, although one might expect at least part of his support to be based on the lands and lordships that he was due to inherit.
If the decisions to rebel made by major barons were more significant in the Welsh marches than in the south-west, their influence operated as much through status, history and claims, as through land, castles and lordship actually held by the leaders in May 1215. If men followed the Braoses, the Fitz Alans and William Marshal junior, it was not because of their 'feudal' power over tenants. Dispossessed lords, minors and the sons of great lords could not automatically expect support from the tenants of honours. It might rather be sympathy, community feeling and hopes of future reward, as well as of present excitement, and these feelings were not necessarily limited to tenants of the Braose, Fitz Alan and Marshal honours. It is not clear whether it was the Fitz Alan tenants, neighbours such as Fulk Fitz Warin, Bartholomew Turet and the Corbet family, the Welsh, or a combination of all of these who were instrumental in King John's apparent loss of control of Oswestry before August 1216. More clearly, it is unlikely that, even with strong Welsh support, the Braoses could have captured all the castles of their lordships in Wales without the assistance or acquiescence of the tenants of their former Welsh lordships.
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As in the south-west, individual grievances played a part in stoking the rebellion in the Welsh marches. When, on 10 May 1215, King John tried making concessions to individuals in an attempt to ward off the revolt, it was to Geoffrey de Mandeville, concerning his fine for the honour of Gloucester, and to Giles de Braose, concerning his fine for his father's lands -both 'western' grievances -that John offered the judgement of his court. 122 Cheney, p. 320. Mandeville's fine, although voluntary, had quite impossibly harsh terms, 20,000 marks to be paid within the year. The Barnwell chronicler notes the rather more reasonable sum of 9,000 marks for which Giles de Braose fined for his father's lands, but as the chronicler also refers to the king's restoring of the lands to him, it may be that this represents the fine made in Oct. 1215 rather than the fine under review in May 1215. Again, though, the terms of repayment might be just as important as the total amount (Walter of Coventry, ii. 225).
The Fitz Alans had suffered what seems a blatant injustice. King John had set a fine of 10,000 marks as relief from William Fitz Alan for the land of his father, also William (d. 1213). In itself, this was unreasonably high for an undisputed succession. However, the king had also agreed a fine of 5,000 marks with Thomas of Erdinton to hold the same land for five years, together with a grant of the marriage of William Fitz Alan to Thomas's daughter. 123 The exact age of William Fitz Alan is unknown, but his younger brother John, and perhaps another brother, if Osbert Fitz Alan was such, were old enough to be accounted rebels in 1215.
In 1211-12, Robert of Berkeley was made to fine for 2,000 marks to regain his lands after being disseised and was ordered to pay 1,000 marks almost immediately -terms which he could not keep. Later he was obliged to promise the king ten knights to serve for a year to clear 500 marks of the debt, and even then was threatened with having to negotiate terms for the remaining debt.
124 Maurice de Gant, lord of Beverstone in Gloucestershire and Hooten Pagnell in Yorkshire, who could also be classified as a 'northerner', was made to account for over £750 of the debts to the Jews owed by his father-in-law, Henry d'Oilly.
125 Fulk Fitz Warin had accumulated a whole series of significant debts to the crown by 1213-14.
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As in the south-west, the royal household and the king's familiares had a firm grip over local office in the Welsh marches. Thomas of Erdinton, household knight and royal ambassador, had been sheriff of Shropshire and Staffordshire since 1205, as well as obtaining custody of the Fitz Alan lands in 1214; William de Cantilupe, royal steward and paymaster, and King John's man since 1198, had been sheriff of Worcestershire since 1207.
127 But more disturbing than the odd curial sheriff was the unusual concentration of 'alien' sheriffs, castellans and custodians in the Welsh marches. Engelard de Cigogné was sheriff of Gloucestershire and Herefordshire from Michaelmas 1209 to July 1215. Braose lands and castles before his death in 1213. 131 The exclusion from office of many of these men by name in Magna Carta says much about the impact that they had made and complaints about their behaviour remained an issue even after 1217. Walter de Lacy and William Marshal had found their lands and custodies in the hands of men such as these too. Prising them loose was not always a quick and easy process, even with the king's favour.
132 The household cabal, with its surfeit of 'aliens', must have seemed as strong in the Welsh marshes as anywhere in the country.
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Such a concentration of power in these hands had been created by the peculiar circumstances of 1208-10, with the fall of William de Braose and the Lacy brothers, together with the earlier eclipse of William Marshal, earl of Pembroke, in 1207. 134 King John had taken some steps backwards since 1212 and the plot on his life, but before 1215 he had not retreated that far. William Marshal's return to favour occurred in the course of 1212, after initially in that year being presumed an enemy of the king. From 1213 onwards, John gave him Haverford -at first for a fine of 1,000 marks, although 500 marks were later pardoned -and the custodies of Cardigan, Carmarthen, Gower and the bishopric of St. Davids. 135 Walter de Lacy's rehabilitation began with the restoration of his English lands in 1213, followed in 1214 by the grant of the vill, although not the castle, of Ludlow. His Irish lands began to be restored, in return for a 4,000 mark fine in mid 1215, although negotiations had begun by March 1215. 136 As we have already seen, the question of the Braose lands had obviously already been broached, although not settled, by May 1215, and Geoffrey de Mandeville had gained possession of the honour of Gloucester in 1214, albeit at the cost of a fine impossible to fulfil. In making concessions, John had won over some people, but not enough to prevent the outbreak of a substantial rebellion in the Welsh marches.
Subsequently, further royal concessions fitfully dismantled the power of the crown as exercised by curial servants in the Welsh marches in favour of local, baronial power. In Herefordshire, Engelard 141 However, despite Hugh de Vivonne's good fortune, the proscribed 'aliens' of Magna Carta had indeed been ejected from the Welsh marches.
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In April 1216, Ranulf earl of Chester, who in May 1215 had already been given the castle of Newcastle-under-Lyme in Staffordshire, was made sheriff of Shropshire and Staffordshire. 143 Although from September 1216 John L'Estrange took over as sheriff, he was a local man of note whose family had settled at Knockin in Shropshire in Henry I's time. At Michaelmas 1217, Ranulf earl of Chester regained the sheriffdoms.
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The general picture is quite clear. In Shropshire, Herefordshire and Gloucestershire, magnates, local barons and local families had, after 1212, and particularly from 1215 onwards, reasserted themselves in the region. The men discussed above remained loyal in 1215-17, but they need to be associated with figures such as Geoffrey de Mandeville, lord of the honour of Gloucester from 1214, and with the Braoses. These rebelled, yet also reasserted baronial power. Indeed, in October 1215 the Braose question seemed for a short while to be settled. Giles de Braose came to terms with the king and the lands that he did not already hold by then were restored to him. How far this process had been put into effect before Giles's death is not clear.
145 Although the siege of Rochester had already begun when Giles's peace was made, it seemed as if a general settlement in the Welsh marches might be possible, although it was ultimately not to be.
The revolt in the Welsh marches was in some ways much more serious than the revolt in the south-west, for two reasons: first, the Braose family cause and the personal role of Giles de Braose were of considerable importance in terms of the rebellion as a whole, at least in its initial stages; and second, the revolt in the Welsh marches on the Welsh side of the border was simply so successful. The Welsh sources stress the alliance between, on the one hand, the English barons and, on the other, Llewelyn ab Iorwerth and the other Welsh princes, with Giles de Braose as the linchpin.
146 In a recent article, Ifor Rowlands has suggested that the surrender of the town and castle of Shrewsbury to Llywelyn ab Iorwerth may have been not only co-ordinated with the entry of 'the Army of God and Holy Church' into London on 17 May 1215, but also partially responsible for John's acquiescence to the negotiations leading to Runnymede and Magna Carta. 147 Whatever the exact timing, between 16 and 25 May 1215, the king was sufficiently worried about the situation in Shropshire to send out a flurry of letters concerned chiefly with the safety of Bridgenorth, the main royal stronghold in the county. 148 As Giles de Braose was at or near Reading on 10 May, it seems likely that his arrangements with the Welsh preceded his journey to join the rebel force at Northampton on 26 April. 149 Painter suggested that the persecution of the Braose family was 'the greatest mistake John made during his reign'. 150 King John himself almost confirmed this with the remarkable public justification of his own conduct that he felt the need to issue in 1212. 151 158 Both examples demonstrate very clearly how the threat from the rebellion and concessions to loyalist barons in the Welsh marches could go hand in hand.
At no time did King John or the regent seem able even to threaten to reverse the losses in Wales. John's peace agreement with Giles de Braose in October 1215 should be seen as an admission of defeat. After Giles's death in November 1215, the Braose lands in John's power were again taken into royal hands. It is significant both that the castle of Bramber had been held by John of Monmouth on behalf of Giles de Braose before his death, and that now all the lands and castles, except for the castle of Knepp and the honour of Bramber in Sussex, were to be held by William Marshal and Walter de Clifford junior.
159 Reginald de Braose, of course, continued to hold all the lands and castles in Wales, but there is a sense that the rest was being held in trust, in safe baronial hands, for when he made peace.
It should also be noted that Walter de Clifford junior, in the letter quoted above, had been worried about defending Herefordshire against attack from the Welsh; there was no thought of counter-attack. It may have been that the loyal marcher barons were not interested in prosecuting a war against rebel marchers. Around Easter 1216, Fulk Fitz Warin was the only named rebel of a number who had made a truce with William Marshal and the other loyal barons of the marches. Painter even suggested that some sort of non-aggression pact had been agreed between William and Reginald de Braose, although only on the basis of the presumably later marriage of William's daughter to Reginald's son.
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In May 1216, King John was seeking to bring Reginald to accept an arrangement similar to that which had been made with Giles. Among those whose help John sought in this mission were Walter de Lacy, Hugh de Mortimer, John of Monmouth and Walter de Clifford, along with Peter Fitz Herbert, whose lands in Blaenllyfni were in Reginald de Braose's hands and who was soon to rebel himself.
161 These were men whom Reginald might be expected to trust, but there was to be no successful outcome.
Between 21 July and 17 August 1216, setting off from and returning to Gloucester, the king made an armed progress through the Welsh border lands, visiting Hereford, Hay, Radnor, Leominster, 'Kingesmehed' (between Leominster and Clun), Clun, Shrewsbury, Oswestry, Whitchurch, Shrewsbury, Bridgenorth and Worcester. Apparently unopposed, the expedition was a mixture of intimidation -burning Hay, Radnor and Oswestry -and attempted conciliation -a safe conduct was issued for Reginald de Braose and approaches were made to some local Welsh leaders.
162 However, beyond showing that the rebels could not face the king's main force, it seems to have achieved little.
The regent, too, pursued reconciliation with Reginald in March 1217.
163 Nothing could be achieved militarily in Wales while the war continued in England.
164 Apart from a brief visit to Goodrich castle, Chepstow and Usk in July 1217, after Reginald de Braose had made peace in June, the regent got no nearer Wales than Gloucester and Tewkesbury.
165 That Reginald rebuffed all approaches from King John and the regent until June 1217 probably had less to do with the terms of peace than with the question of trust, and Reginald's desire to avoid breaking his alliance with Llywelyn, sealed by his marriage to Llywelyn's daughter.
166
On their own, the successes of the Braoses and of Llywelyn in Wales, however dramatic, could hardly threaten the survival of the Plantagenet dynasty. There is no denying that King John and the regency did have powerful baronial support in the region, from the likes of Ranulf earl of Chester, William Marshal, earl of Pembroke, Henry Fitz Count, Walter de Lacy, Hugh de Mortimer, Robert de Mortimer, the Cliffords and John of Monmouth. We may, however, question how solid and how principled the loyalty of this group was. Too much has been made of William Marshal's own propaganda as regent and the afterthoughts of his biographer as to William's 'deep essential loyalty'.
167 This was never really put to the test before William threw the dice at Lincoln and won. In any case, others had to remain loyal as well.
Although in general there seems to have been less of a strengthening of the rebellion in the summer of 1216 in the Welsh marches than there was in the south-west, Prince Louis might have come to the Welsh marches, or at least John certainly thought so. In mid August 1216, the king issued special instructions to John Marshal at Worcester and Walter de Lacy at Hereford, not to allow themselves to be trapped inside their castles by Louis's army.
168 Partly, perhaps, this was a precaution needed because of John's planned and final, as it turned out, expedition to East Anglia and Lincolnshire, but it shows how potentially fluid the situation was.
An example of this, and of the ambivalent position of the loyalist barons in the Welsh marches, is provided by the brief rebellion of 171 But the aftermath is very interesting. William de Cantilupe was replaced as sheriff by John Marshal, to whom control of the forest of Worcester was also transferred.
172 After Walter's submission, he was quickly and fully restored to his lands, as were many of his followers, and during the process of making his submission and obtaining his absolution from the legate his lands were transferred from William de Cantilupe to the 'respectable' hands of Walter de Lacy, Hugh de Mortimer, Walter de Clifford and John of Monmouth.
173 In March 1217 Walter de Beauchamp himself was made sheriff of Worcestershire and custodian of the forest of the county. 174 The conclusion that Walter's rebellion was to some extent thought excusable by the principal loyalist barons, and that the problem was dealt with 'their way', is inescapable.
If one seeks to compare the rebellions in south-western England and in the Welsh marches with each other and with the northern rebellion as analysed by Holt, one has to acknowledge that each region necessarily had its own set of individual actors, its own structures of lordship and Rebellion in south-western England and the Welsh marches, 1215-17 217 government, and its own history. Nevertheless, it is striking how applicable Holt's conclusions about the northern rebellion are to the revolts in the other two regions. The problems -grievances, individual and collective, over the king's handling of patronage and administrative office; an unaccustomed financial pressure from the king; the behaviour of the 'king's friends'; and a local society's resentment at intrusion by outsiders -certainly were not exclusive to the northern counties of England. Regarding the question of the importance of honorial loyalties in the rebellion, the evidence presented here provides a little extra ammunition for both sides of the debate, but, as suggested in the introduction, cannot really help to decide it.
Individual grievances and honorial solidarities played a more significant role in bringing about a substantial rebellion in the Welsh marches than in the south-west. In part, this was because of a somewhat different structure of landholding, with more powerful, often relatively compact baronies and lordships, and because of such important individual grievances as those of the Braose and Fitz Alan families. Geoffrey de Mandeville's lordship of the honours of Gloucester and Glamorgan, and the huge fine that he owed for those lands, was also significant. If the fine were to be paid, or even any considerable part of it, it would no doubt have fallen, perhaps quite heavily, on the tenants of these honours. The number of rebel tenants of these honours may also have had much to do with unhappiness at their past treatment while the honours were in royal hands, at the mercy of men like Falkes de Bréauté, Gerard d'Athée and Guy de Chanceaux.
In the Welsh marches, we do not see such strong evidence of the collective feelings of county society as in the south-west. Yet, taking into account the royal decisions made to head off rebellion and to encourage the loyalty of men like Ranulf earl of Chester, Walter de Clifford junior, Walter de Lacy and of course William Marshal, we can see the power of King John's household and favourites in both south-western England and the Welsh marches as a common theme in the causes of the rebellion. In the Welsh marches, the 'alien' element in this household dominance of local government was particularly strong, and evidently particularly irksome. More generally, the aggressive behaviour of men like William Briwerre, Hugh de Neville, Gerard d'Athée, Engelard de Cigogné and Falkes de Bréauté could provide a common cause between rebel marcher lordships and the communities represented in phrases like 'the men of Cornwall', 'the men of Devon' or 'the men of Dorset and Somerset'.
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In both areas it also linked the cause of the rebels to that of the loyalist barons, albeit pursued by other means.
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